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I. INTRODUCTION
"All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession... which
ought not to be spread abroad,I will keep secret and will never reveal."
-Hippocratic Oath.'

A Midwestern banker, who also served as a member of his
county's health board, cross-referenced a health board's list of patients
suffering from various diseases with a list of the bank's customers. He
then called due the mortgages of anyone suffering from cancer. 2 In
Oregon, computer disks containing the medical records of 365,000
patients were stolen from a car. Along with personal medical
information, the records also contained the patients' names,
addresses, and Social Security numbers. 3 A Maryland school board
member's medical records, revealing that he had been treated for
depression, were sent to school officials along with an anonymous note
4
that read, "Is this the kind of person we want on the School Board?"
These are just a few of the many recent incidents confirming
that breaches of medical privacy occur on a disturbingly regular

1.
Andrew A. Skolnick, Opposition to Law Officers Having Unfettered Access to Medical
Records, 279 JAMA 257, 257 (1998).
The professional codes of nearly every health care profession (for example,
the ethics codes for physicians, nurses, dentists and dental hygienists, mental
health professionals, social workers, pharmacists, and chiropractors) and the
ethical standards of numerous health care professional associations (for
example, hospitals and health care executives) all explicitly require respect
for the principles of privacy and confidentiality. The codes may refer to
privacy or confidentiality as a 'core value' or a 'fundamental tenet' and
usually make respect for privacy a central or guiding principle of the health
professions.

Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad For Your Health? An Introduction to the Law, Ethics,
and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 481, 493-94 (2000).
2.
Marianne Lavelle, Health Plan Debate Turning to Privacy; Some Call For Safeguards
on Medical Disclosure.Is a Federal Law Necessary?, NAT'L L. J., May 30, 1994, at Al.
Joe Rojas-Burke & Joseph Rose, 365,000 Lose Health Files to Thief, THE OREGONIAN,
3.
Jan. 26, 2006, at Al.

4.

Christina A. Samuels, Allen Makes Diagnosis of Depression Public; Medical Records

Mailed Anonymously, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2000, at V1.
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basis. 5 The nature of the information contained in medical records and
the potentially devastating results of improper disclosures make
medical privacy violations abhorrent. Medical records contain highly
sensitive information, including intimate details about the patient's
illnesses, sexually transmitted diseases, genetic abnormalities, drug
and alcohol addictions, and mental or psychological disorders. 6 These
records also often include information about the patient's financial
status, social behaviors, and personal relationships, 7 as well as
identifying information like Social Security numbers.8 Improper
disclosure of such sensitive information may subject patients to social
isolation, discrimination by employers, or denial of insurance
coverage. 9
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA"), adopted by Congress in 1996, aims to protect the security
and privacy of health information. 10 The regulations promulgated
pursuant to this Act apply to "covered entities," which include (1)
health plans, such as health insurance companies, HMOs, Medicare,
and Medicaid; (2) health care clearinghouses, such as billing
companies and third party administrators; and (3) health care
providers, such as hospitals and doctors.1" These regulations protect
patient privacy by restricting disclosure of health information to the
''minimum necessary," while also preventing unauthorized use by
"downstream users.' 2
While HIPAA imposes a host of obligations on covered entities
in an attempt to increase patient privacy, it does not explicitly create
any individual rights for patients affected by medical privacy
violations. Therefore, a patient who has been seriously harmed as a
result of these privacy leaks cannot bring a lawsuit against the
responsible party. Instead, a victim's only recourse is to file a
5.
For more examples of similar medical privacy violations, see Health Privacy Project,
Medical Privacy Stories, http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr doc/PrivacyViolations.pdf.
6.
Amy M. Jurevic, When Technology and Health Care Collide: Issues with Electronic
Medical Records and Electronic Mail, 66 UMKC. L. REV. 809, 809-10 (1998).
7.
Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Nationalization of Health Information Privacy
Protections,8 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 284-85 (2002).
8.
Jean P. Fisher, Hacker Hits Duke System; Personal Data, Passwords Taken, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 4, 2005, at D1.
9.
See Gostin et al., supra note 7, at 285 (detailing some of the results of medical privacy
violations); Jurevic, supra note 6, at 810 (same).
10. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2006). The HIPAA provisions relating specifically to the
confidentiality of medical records will hereinafter be referred to as the "Privacy Rule."
11. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006).
12. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1) (stating that a covered entity may only release protected
health information to its business associates if it receives satisfactory assurance that the
business associate will take the appropriate steps to ensure the confidentiality of the
information).
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complaint with the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"). 13 If HHS decides to pursue a victim's complaint, it may
impose fines against the responsible covered entity. 14 However, since
HIPAA's enactment, HHS has rarely imposed fines or criminal
sanctions.' 5 Regardless of any enforcement action taken by HHS, the
victim will not be compensated for the harm caused by this breach of
privacy.
Lack of medical record protection does not just harm those
whose privacy is violated; it can have negative effects on the entire
healthcare system. Although a majority of Americans are concerned
about their medical privacy, many do not understand their rights
under HIPAA.' 6 As a result, individuals do not have faith in the
health care system's ability to protect their medical privacy. Despite
the protections provided by HIPAA's Privacy Rule, this mistrust leads
17
one in eight patients to engage in "privacy protective behaviors,"'
such as providing inaccurate information to doctors or avoiding
treatment altogether.' 8 Lack of full participation in the health care
system not only puts these mistrusting individuals at a significant
health risk; 19 it also can be detrimental to the health care system and
society as a whole. For example, privacy protective behaviors make
"the clinical information used for research, public health initiatives,
outcomes analyses, and other studies.., unreliable." 20 Thus, medical
privacy remains a major health care issue because the current
protections afforded by the Privacy Rule have not been sufficient to
solve this problem.
Unenforced rules are futile. HIPAA created federal rules in
order to remedy a perceived problem in the health care industry-the
lack of medical privacy. However, if there is no way for health care
13. 45 C.F.R. § 160.306.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b) (2006).
15. According to one report, HHS had not yet brought a single civil enforcement action
under HIPAA as of November, 2005. Joseph Conn, Ruling Called HIPAA Barrier, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 14, 2005, at 16. There has only been one criminal conviction under HIPAA.
United States v. Gibson, No. CR04-0374RSM, 2004 WL 2188280 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2004);
Trial Pleading, United States v. Gibson, No. CR04-0374RSM, 2004 WL 2237585 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 19, 2004).
16. A recent survey by the California HealthCare Foundation found that "[diespite new
federal protections, 67 percent of Americans remain concerned about the privacy of their
personal health information and are largely unaware of their rights." California HealthCare
Foundation, Americans Have Acute Concerns about the Privacy of Personal Health Information
(Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.chcf.org/press/view.cfm?itemlD=1 15814.
17. Id.
18. Janlori Goldman, The New Federal Health Privacy Regulations: How Will States Take
the Lead?, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 395, 396 (2001).
19. California HealthCare Foundation, supranote 16.
20. Goldman, supra note 18, at 396.
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consumers to enforce the rules, and no way for them to ensure that
HHS enforces the rules, the Act will not achieve its objectives. Health
care providers cannot be expected to fully protect patient information
without adequate incentives. As former HHS Secretary Donna Shalala
stated, "Only if we put the force of law behind our rhetoric can we
expect people to have confidence that their health information is
protected, and ensure that those holding health information will take
their responsibilities seriously." 21 Unless patients harmed by the
improper disclosure of their private medical records are able to bring
actions against the responsible parties, HIPAA's Privacy Rule will
remain woefully under-enforced, and Congress's goal of protecting
medical privacy will remain frustratingly out of reach.
This Note will explore several potential private rights of action
that individuals could bring against entities that improperly disclose
patients' medical records in violation of HIPAA's Privacy Rule. Section
II will analyze the possibility of bringing a § 1983 claim against an
entity that improperly discloses medical records. However, it will
argue that the Supreme Court's recent decisions in this area have
severely limited the availability of § 1983. As a result, plaintiffs
probably cannot use § 1983 to enforce Privacy Rule violations. Section
III will discuss the False Claims Act and analyze the opportunity for
qui tam plaintiffs to bring an action against the offending party on
behalf of the federal government. Though such action may be possible,
this Section will show that qui tam enforcement of the Privacy Rule
would be contrary to the policies and legal standards set forth by the
Supreme Court, and therefore courts should not allow patients to
bring these actions. Section IV will advance tort law as a possible
solution to this problem and argue that the traditional breach of
confidentiality cause of action should be reanalyzed in light of HIPAA
standards in order to provide patients with a means of redress for
Privacy Rule violations.
II. SECTION 1983
A. Background
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue parties who deprive
them of federally secured rights. It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

21. Proposed Rules, Department of Health and Human Services, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,923 (Nov.
3, 1999).
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other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...22

Prior to 1980, § 1983 was narrowly construed to prevent
private enforcement of civil rights.2 3 This barrier to private
enforcement was compounded by the Supreme Court's decision to limit
implied rights of action dramatically by presuming that no such right
existed absent a finding of affirmative legislative intent to the
contrary. 24 As a result, the beneficiaries of federal statutes "had a
recognized primary right-i.e., a duty owed them by the state-but no
''
remedial right with which to enforce it. 25
The Supreme Court addressed this problem in Maine v.
Thiboutot.26 In Thiboutot, the Court faced the issue of whether § 1983
was limited to the enforcement of constitutional rights, civil rights,
and equal protection laws, or whether it could be used to enforce state
violations of rights conferred by any statute. Making a textual
argument, the Court held that the words "and laws" in § 1983 must
refer to statutes in order to add independent meaning to the phrase
"secured by the Constitution and laws. ' 27 Therefore, the Court held
that § 1983 could be used to enforce rights conferred in any statute.
Since Thiboutot, § 1983 has played an important role in the
enforcement of private rights by empowering private citizens to bring
actions against those who are not in compliance with constitutional or
statutory requirements. However, the Court has chipped away at
Thiboutot's broad interpretation of § 1983, a trend culminating in
Gonzaga University v. Doe28 and City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.
29
Abrams.
B. Limiting § 1983 Actions
1. Gonzaga University v. Doe
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court significantly
limited a civil rights plaintiffs ability to bring a private action under
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
23. Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a Coherent
Section 1983 Jurisprudence,103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1842-43 (2003).
24. Transamerican Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1979).
25. Samberg-Champion, supra note 23, at 1844.
26. Maine v. Thiboutot, 488 U.S. 1 (1980).
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
29. City of Ranch Palo Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
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§ 1983. The Court held that the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act ("FERPA") 30 did not create any individual rights capable
of § 1983 enforcement. 31 Doe, a student at Gonzaga University
("Gonzaga"), was denied certification as a Washington schoolteacher
when a Gonzaga employee contacted the state agency responsible for
teacher certification and, identifying the student by name, informed
the agency that the university was investigating him for possible
sexual misconduct. 32 Doe brought a § 1983 action against Gonzaga,
alleging that it had violated his rights under FERPA by releasing
33
personal information without his consent.
Before ultimately rejecting Doe's claim, the Court noted that its
previous decisions in this area were not entirely clear and decided to
resolve the ambiguity in its § 1983 jurisprudence by explicitly
narrowing the standard for finding rights that are capable of § 1983
enforcement. 34 First, the Court noted that "Section 1983 provides a
remedy only for the deprivation of 'rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.
Accordingly, it is rights, not the broader or vaguer 'benefits' or
'interests,' that may be enforced under the authority of that section." 35
Thus, the Court emphasized that a "violation of a federal right, not
merely a violation of federal law" is required to establish an action
under § 1983.36 Second, the Court held that only "unambiguously
conferred" rights give rise to § 1983 actions, explicitly rejecting the
37
notion that anything less would provide grounds for a § 1983 suit.
Whether Congress has conferred a right is a question of congressional
intent-an inquiry no different from that required in implied right of

30. FERPA provides that "[n]o funds shall be made available under any application
program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the
release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein... ) of
students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization."
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2006). It was enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power, and calls
for the withholding of federal funds from educational institutions that fail to adequately protect
their students' educational records. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 278-79.
31. Id. at 276.
32. Id. at 277.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 278, 280-86. As one commentator has stated, this intentional decision by the
Court to clarify its prior holdings in regards to Section 1983 gives this opinion "importance far
beyond its immediate context," and as such is the seminal case in determining whether a Section
1983 action exists under HIPAA. Mark Andrew Ison, Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right: Medicaid,
Section 1983 and the Cost of an Enforceable Right to Health Care, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1504
(2003).
35. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002)).
36. Id. at 282 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)).
37. Id. at 282-83.
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action cases. 38 In order for Congress to confer a right on an individual,
the statute must be "phrased in terms of the persons benefited"
39
instead of in terms of the party that the law is seeking to regulate.
Thus, the Court made it clear that congressional intent determines
whether a statute is enforceable by § 1983.
Having established the standard for determining whether a §
1983 claim exists, the Court examined FERPA's text and held that its
nondisclosure provisions unquestionably fail to confer enforceable
rights. 40 First, the Court noted that FERPA does not focus on the
rights of individual students, but instead speaks to the Secretary of
Education, directing the Secretary to deny funding to institutions that
have policies or practices that violate the statute. 41 Since "[s]tatutes
that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals
protected create 'no implication of an intent to confer rights on a
particular class of persons,' "42 the Court held that FERPA lacked the
rights-creating language that triggers § 1983. 43 Additionally, the
Court noted that "FERPA's nondisclosure provisions ... speak only in
terms of institutional policy and practice, not individual instances of
disclosure" 44 and that this sort of " 'aggregate' focus" cut strongly
against the argument that Congress intended to confer individual
rights. 45 Finally, the Court noted that institutions need only
substantially comply with FERPA's requirements in order to keep
their federal funding. 46 This vague standard, requiring the Secretary
of Education to use independent judgment to determine whether
institutions have violated this Act, suggests that Congress did not
intend to create individually enforceable rights.
It is clear that Gonzaga significantly heightened the standard
for § 1983 actions, allowing only the clearest and most explicitly
conferred rights to be enforced. However, the Court went one step
47
further in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.

38. See id. at 290 ("[I]f Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it
must do so in clear and unambiguous terms - no less and no more than what is required for
Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private right of action.").
39. Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979)).
40. Id. at 287.
41. See id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1232g(b)(1) (2002)).
42. Id. at 287 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 288.
45. Id. (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997)).
46. Id.
47. City of Ranch Palo Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
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2. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams
In City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, the Supreme Court
further restricted the use of § 1983. The Court held that a plaintiff
could not use § 1983 to enforce certain provisions of the
Telecommunications Act ("TCA"), reasoning that the presence of an
independent judicial remedy within the statute itself shows that
Congress did not intend for it to be enforced through a separate
48
statutory vehicle.
The Court built upon its prior holding in Gonzaga by focusing
its inquiry solely on whether Congress intended to create a right
enforceable under § 1983. The Court did not dispute the fact that the
TCA created individually enforceable rights; 49 however, it noted that
the existence of such rights does not end the inquiry. Rather,
individually enforceable rights create a rebuttable presumption of §
1983 enforcement that may be defeated by demonstrating a lack of
50
congressional intent for such a remedy.
Since the Court found that the TCA provided for a judicial
remedy completely independent of § 1983,51 the central question
became whether Congress intended that remedy "to coexist with an
alternative remedy available in a § 1983 action." 52 The Court decided
that this could not be the case, reasoning that "[t]he provision of an
express, private means of redress in the statute itself is ordinarily an
indication that Congress did not intend to leave open a more
expansive remedy under § 1983." 53 By including a non-§ 1983 judicial
4
remedy, Congress precluded resort to § 1983.5
While Abrams makes clear that statutes containing a provision
for independent judicial remedies cannot be enforced under § 1983, it
does not indicate whether statutes providing for administrative
remedies, such as those contained in HIPAA, would be barred under
the same line of reasoning.

48. Id. at 120-21.
49. Id. at 120.
50. Id. (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)).
51. Id. at 116. The TCA provides that "[a]ny person adversely affected... may, within 30
days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2005).
52. Abrams, 544 U.S. at 121.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 127.
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C. Using § 1983 to Enforce the Privacy Rule
Plaintiffs seeking to use § 1983 to redress Privacy Rule
violations must allege that HIPAA gives them the right to medical
privacy and that the defendant deprived them of this right by
disclosing their private medical information. However, the Supreme
Court's trend toward limiting the applicability of § 1983 makes it
doubtful that a plaintiff could successfully use § 1983 to enforce a
violation of HIPAA's Privacy Rule. The Privacy Rule ostensibly lacks
the explicit rights-creating language that the court required in
Gonzaga. Additionally, Abrams poses a barrier to the use of § 1983 to
enforce Privacy Rule violations since the administrative remedies set
forth by HIPPA arguably preclude resort to § 1983.
1. Gonzaga Precludes Enforcement of the Privacy Rule Through
§ 1983
While it is not clear exactly how far Gonzaga extends, it would
nevertheless seem to preclude § 1983 as a potential avenue for the
enforcement of HIPAA's Privacy Rule, which "lack[s] the sort of
'rights-creating' language critical to showing the requisite
congressional intent to create new rights." 55 The Gonzaga Court
pointed to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 as examples of statutes that create
individual rights because they unmistakably focus on the benefited
class 56 by stating that that "[n]o person... shall. .. be subjected to
discrimination. . .

."57

In contrast, the Privacy Rule states that "[a]

covered entity may not use or disclose protected health
information.. ."58 Thus, the Privacy Rule focuses on the offending
party's conduct as opposed to the injured party's rights. This language
is similar to that contained in FERPA, which the Gonzaga court held
did not contain rights-creating language. 59 Since the Privacy Rule is

55. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002).
56. Id. at 284.
57. Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall ... be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (2005). Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex... be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005).
58. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2006).
59. FERPA provides that "[n]o funds shall be made available.., to any educational agency
or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records ......
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2006). Compare this with HIPAA's privacy rule, which provides that "[a]
covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information .. " 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)
(2006).
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phrased in terms of an obligation imposed on health care providers
and, as such, does not explicitly give patients an individual right to
privacy, it seemingly cannot be enforced under § 1983.
2. After Gonzaga, Can Agency Regulations Ever Be Enforced by
§ 1983?
In light of Gonzaga, some commentators have questioned
whether any regulations promulgated by administrative agencies-as
opposed to direct congressional legislation-can ever carry the sort of
60
congressional intent that Gonzaga requires for § 1983 enforcement.
The uncertainty lies in whether Congress intended to create a federal
right when it did not write the regulation itself, but instead delegated
that authority to an administrative agency. For instance, HHS could
have used rights-creating language when it created the Privacy Rule,
phrasing it "in terms of the person benefited," 61 instead of "in terms of
institutional policy and practice," 62 but it is not clear that this would
be enough to impute the congressional intent necessary for § 1983
enforcement. It is doubtful that administrative agencies can be
considered to speak for Congress. Therefore, it is possible that no
administrative regulation, including the Privacy Rule, survives
Gonzaga to allow for § 1983 enforcement.
Since § 1983 allows for the private enforcement of "rights...
secured by the Constitution and laws," 63 the inquiry is two-fold.
Courts must ask (1) whether regulations are "laws," and (2) whether
regulations can secure federal "rights." Circuit courts have split on the
first question, 64 but there is at least some support for the proposition
that a regulation may have the "force and effect of law" sufficient for §
1983 enforcement. 65 In Chrysler Corporation v. Brown, the Supreme
Court held that an agency regulation would carry the "force and effect
of law" if it was a substantive rule, properly promulgated under
66
congressional authority.

60.

Andrew L. Campbell, Can Federal Regulations Ever Create Federal Rights Privately

Enforceable Under Section 1983?, 38 IND. L. REV. 727, 728 (2005).

61. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13
(1979)).
62. Id. at 288.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
64. See Campbell, supra note 60, at 739-40 (analyzing the circuit split on whether
regulations can be enforced under Section 1983).
65. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979).
66. Id. at 301-02. Following this analysis, the Court in Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority declared that certain Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") regulations were enforceable under Section 1983. Wright v. City of Roanoke
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However, Gonzaga arguably precludes the enforcement of
agency regulations through § 1983 in the second half of the inquirywhether regulations can secure federal "rights." In Alexander v.
Sandoval, the Supreme Court held that regulations promulgated by
the Department of Justice pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 did not create an implied private right of action. 67 Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia declared that "it is most certainly
incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private
cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress." 68 Thus,
Sandoval held that an implied right of action could only be derived
from the enabling statute, and not from the regulation itself.
Gonzaga seems to have extended this holding beyond implied
right of action cases and into the realm of § 1983 analysis. The
Gonzaga Court explicitly stated that "our implied right of action cases
should guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights
enforceable under § 1983."69 Under this line of reasoning, courts
should follow Sandoval (an implied right of action case) in
determining whether regulations can secure federal rights-a
question Sandoval answers with a resounding "no." Therefore,
Gonzaga apparently supports the proposition that only Congress, and
not an agency, can create individual rights that are enforceable under
§ 1983. If this is true, agency regulations, including those promulgated
under HIPAA, cannot be enforced through § 1983, even if they
otherwise appear to create an unambiguously conferred right.
Regardless of whether Gonzaga precludes agencies in all
instances from creating individual rights, the Privacy Rule's unique
legislative history may itself rule out any possibility of rights creation
in this particular case. When it enacted HIPAA in 1996, Congress did
not originally grant HHS the authority to promulgate the regulations
that we now know as the Privacy Rule. Rather, HIPAA required
Congress itself to promulgate comprehensive privacy legislation
within three years.7 0 HIPAA only granted HHS the authority to step
in and issue its own privacy regulations in the event that Congress
failed to act within this time frame. 7 1 After three years of
Congressional inactivity, HHS undertook the task of promulgating the

Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 431 (1987) (holding that HUD regulations
carried "the force of law", thereby conferring an enforceable right to plaintiffs).
67. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
68. Id. at 291.
69. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note (Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 264(c)(1)).
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Privacy Rule by default. 72 This situation is substantially unlike the
traditional case of Congress explicitly authorizing an agency to
promulgate regulations. When Congress enacted HIPAA, it fully
intended to write the Privacy Rule itself, not to allow the agency to act
on its behalf. Congress's failure to meet its own deadline cannot be
interpreted to carry the same degree of deferral to the agency as if it
had explicitly granted this authority at the outset. This unique
legislative history draws into question how much authority HHS
should be assumed to have, and whether it is proper to read these
regulations as being indicative of any degree of congressional intent.
Any suggestion of an individual right in HHS's Privacy Rule certainly
cannot be imputed to Congress under these unusual circumstances.
3. Abrams Might Also Preclude § 1983 Enforcement of the Privacy
Rule
Even if the Privacy Rule passed the Gonzaga test, it would face
another barrier to § 1983 enforcement in City of Rancho Palos Verdes
v. Abrams.73 The Court in Abrams held that statutes containing an
independent judicial remedy could not be enforced by § 1983. 74 The
75
specific provision at issue in Abrams provided for a judicial remedy.
Therefore, there is some question as to whether or not an
administrativeremedy, such as that provided for in HIPAA, would act
to preclude § 1983 actions in the same way. However, dicta in the
opinion suggest that the presence of an administrative remedy would
have a similar effect. Justice Scalia noted that "in all of the cases in
which we have held that § 1983 is available for violation of a federal
statute, we have emphasized that the statute at issue ... did not
provide a private judicial remedy (or, in most of the cases, even a
76
private administrative remedy) for the rights violated."
HIPAA's privacy regulations contain a fairly detailed
enforcement scheme. Although the Privacy Rule does not allow
affected persons to seek individual redress, it does allow individuals to

72 Jennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out - The Burdens and Challenges of HIPAA Compliance:
A Look at PreemptionAnalysis, the "Minimum Necessary" Standard, and the Notice of Privacy

Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 145 n.8 (2003).

73. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
74. Id. at 127.
75. The TCA provides: "Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by
a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this
subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (2005).
76.

Abrams, 544 U.S. at 121.
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file complaints against non-compliant entities. 77 Furthermore, HHS
can commence compliance reviews to determine whether an entity is
in compliance with HIPAA regulations. 78 The regulations are enforced
through a scheme of both civil fines and criminal punishment. As a
civil matter, the Secretary may fine anyone who violates HIPAA not
more than $100 per violation, up to a total of $25,000 per year for all
violations of a single regulation.7 9 As a criminal matter, anyone who
knowingly uses, obtains, or discloses identifiable health information
can be fined up to $50,000 or imprisoned for up to one year. 0 A person
who commits an offense "under false pretenses" may be subject to
fines up to $100,000 and imprisonment up to five years81 and a person
who commits an offense "for commercial advantage, personal gain, or
malicious harm" may be subject to fines up to $250,000 and up to ten
82
years imprisonment.
Abrams suggests that the administrative remedies provided in
the HIPAA regulations might be enough to preclude the use of § 1983
as a vehicle for statutory enforcement since such an action "would
83
distort the scheme of ... limited remedies" found within the statute.
Therefore, plaintiffs seeking to bring § 1983 actions for Privacy Rule
violations face significant hurdles in both Gonzaga and Abrams. Since
the Supreme Court's trend toward limiting § 1983's scope severely
limits the ability of plaintiffs to bring these suits, patients whose
medical privacy rights have been violated must look elsewhere for a
possible right of action.
III. FALSE CLAIMS ACT

A. Background
The False Claims Act ("FCA") is a civil statute designed "to
84
protect government funds and property from fraudulent claims."
Originally passed in 1863 to prevent the fraudulent use of government
funds during the Civil War,8 5 the FCA imposes liability upon "[a]ny
77. 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2006). HHS provides a Health Information Privacy Complaint
form that can be retrieved online at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/howtofileprivacy.pdf (last visited
Jan. 27, 2006).
78. 45 C.F.R. § 160.308 (2006).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a) (2000).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(1) (2000).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(2) (2000).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(3) (2000).
83. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005).
84. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
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person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an
officer or employee of the United States Government... a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval. . .. ,,86 Thus, the elements
that must be proved to establish a violation of the False Claims Act
are: (1) the defendant presented or caused a third party to present a
claim to the government, (2) the claim was false or fraudulent, and (3)
the defendant acted knowingly. FCA claims may be brought by the
Department
of Justice or by private parties acting as
"whistleblowers."' 7 In these so-called qui tam actions,8 8 a private party
(or "relator") is authorized to bring a suit on behalf of the government
89
and, if successful, may share in the potentially large recovery.
The FCA has recently gained popularity among plaintiffs as a
way to bring claims of health care fraud against entities that receive
government benefits in the form of Medicare and Medicaid funds. 90
Although creative plaintiffs could conceivably adapt the various
theories used to support FCA enforcement of health care fraud to the
Privacy Rule context, this Note will argue that such a theory would be
contrary to congressional intent and would have a negative impact on
the provision of medical services as a whole. Before this argument can
be made, however, it is necessary to dissect the various theories of the
FCA, particularly as they have developed as a weapon to combat
health care fraud and abuse. 9 1
1. Getting to Implied False Certification: Theories of FCA
Enforcement
The most basic application of the False Claims Act occurs when
the claim for federal funds itself is factually false. 92 In such cases, the

86. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
87. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(b) (2000).
88. The term comes from the Latin "Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro sic ipso in hoc parte
sequitur," which means, "who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).

89. An unsuccessful FCA defendant may be liable to the government for up to $10,000 in
civil fines, plus treble damages. 31 U.S.C. §3729 (2000). Qui tam plaintiffs are eligible to receive
up to 30 percent of the government's total recovery, plus court costs and attorneys' fees. 31
U.S.C. §3730(d) (2000).
90. See Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discreditingthe Use of
Alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1003,
1004 (1998) ("[G]overnment prosecutors and private parties are frequently turning to the Civil
False Claims Act as their weapon of choice in waging the 'war' on health care fraud and abuse.").
91. The health care fraud and abuse laws include the Anti-Self-Referral ("Stark") law, 42
U.S.C.A. §1395nn (2005), and the Anti-Kickback law, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b (2005).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 230 & n.2 (1968) (holding
that a grain dealer who furnished false invoices, which overstated the purchase price of the bins
of grain he sold, was expressly within the reach of the False Claims Act).
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plaintiff need only present some objective evidence showing that the
information on the defendant's claim was inaccurate and that the
defendant knew or should have known that this was the case. This
straightforward theory of the FCA applies in the health care setting
when a provider submits a claim for federal Medicaid or Medicare
funds for services that it never provided 93 or for services that were not
94
medically necessary.
One step removed from this traditional application of the FCA
is the theory of "false certification," which has recently developed to
allow private parties to enforce health fraud laws. Under this theory, a
claim is false when it "falsely certifies compliance with a particular
statute, regulation or contractual term, where compliance is a
prerequisite to payment." 95 Therefore, the claim is considered to be
false not because of the substantive information included in the claim
itself, but because of its false representation of compliance. The claim
is legally false even though the medical services claimed for
reimbursement were provided and were medically necessary.
"False certification" allows liability to attach even though the
government has not suffered a cognizable pecuniary loss. United
States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc. held that the FCA
does not require actual damage to the government. 96 Instead, the
plaintiff need only show that the government made payments to an
unworthy recipient. 97 The district court reasoned that the FCA was
"intended to govern not only fraudulent acts that create a loss to the
government but also those fraudulent acts that cause the government
98
to pay out sums of money to claimants it did not intend to benefit."
Under this theory, there need not be a nexus between the statute that
is being ignored and the activity for which payment is being claimed
since, theoretically, the violation of any regulation or statute could
make a claim "false" if compliance with that law was a prerequisite to
payment. 99

93. See United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F.Supp. 1127, 1130-31 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding
defendant dentist liable under the FCA for submitting claims for certain oral examinations as
"limited consultations" when they were in fact simply routine dental examinations).
94. See In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318, 334-36 (D. Conn. 2004)
(holding that, if a hospital billed Medicare for procedures that were not reasonably necessary,
this would constitute fraudulent conduct under the FCA).
95. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001).
96. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1507, 1509, 1513 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996).
97. Id. at 1513.
98. Id.
99. The "false certification" theory has gained traction in other jurisdictions, as well. For
example, the Fifth Circuit tentatively accepted Pogue's reasoning in United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation. United States ex rel. Thompson v.
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The "implied false certification" theory (also called the "tainted
claim" theory) extends the False Claims Act one step further. An
implied false certification claim is "based on the notion that the act of
submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with
governing federal rules that are a precondition to payment."'100 Under
this theory, no explicit statement of compliance is required because
the defendant has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it follows
the law. Simply by submitting the claim, the defendant impliedly
certifies compliance with all applicable regulations.
Unlike the express false certification theory, the implied false
certification theory requires some nexus between the alleged noncompliance and the activity for which payment is claimed.'10 For
example, a claim for Medicare reimbursement does not violate the
False Claims Act simply because the hospital does not comply with a
local zoning ordinance. There must be some relation between the
claim for federal funds and the regulation that is not being followed.
In the health fraud setting, plaintiffs argue that this nexus is satisfied
because providers that receive Medicare and Medicaid funds have an
02
obligation to ensure compliance with all HHS regulations.
Furthermore, the FCA requires that the defendant have actual
knowledge that the claim is false, or must deliberately ignore or
recklessly disregard this fact. 0 3 The FCA's scienter requirement is
completely independent of the scienter requirement imposed by the
underlying statute or regulation that has allegedly placed the
defendant in a position of non-compliance. This effectively creates a
dual scienter requirement for FCA claims. First, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to establish a
violation of the underlying statute, and then must prove that the
defendant also had knowledge that the certification of compliance was
false.

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997). The court stated that
"where the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant's certification of
compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent
claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation." Id. at 902.
Thus, Thompson seems to allow recovery under the FCA even when the claimed services were
appropriately rendered, depending on the nature of the certification required for payment.
100. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699.
101. See Phelps, supra note 87, at 1015-16 (noting that the FCA theory of implied false
certification requires courts to analyze "whether a relation exists between the subject matter of
the false statement and the government's loss").
102. See id. at 1016 n.60 (remarking that this implied obligation probably stems from
statements made in the 1986 Senate Report that "those doing business with the Government
have an obligation to make a limited inquiry to ensure the claims they submit are accurate"
(quoting S. REP. No. 99-345, at 7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5272)).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2000).
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2. Advantages of the FCA
The FCA has become an attractive tool for plaintiffs to bring
suits against health care entities for several reasons. First, it allows
plaintiffs to sue under statutes that do not themselves create a private
right of action. For instance, despite the fact that neither the AntiSelf-Referral ("Stark") law 10 4 nor the Anti-Kickback law 10 5 provides a
private cause of action, plaintiffs have been able to use the qui tam
provisions of the FCA to prosecute alleged violations of both of these
106
statutes.
Second, the FCA affords plaintiffs certain evidentiary
advantages. Plaintiffs that use the FCA to prosecute fraud under the
Stark or Anti-Kickback laws bear only a civil burden of proof and
therefore need only show that the fraudulent activity occurred by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt
as would be required in a criminal fraud prosecution brought under
either of these laws independently. 10 7 Additionally, the FCA requires
no showing that a defendant's violation of the statute harmed the
government. 108
The only potential evidentiary hurdle imposed on FCA
plaintiffs is the "original source" requirement, which states that the
whistleblower must be the "original source" of the information upon
which the FCA claim is based; claims cannot be based on information
that has already been publicly disclosed. 10 9 However, even this
limitation may be relatively inconsequential since some courts have
been quite permissive in who they determine to be an "original
source."" 0
The potential for large recoveries makes the False Claims Act
an attractive option for would-be plaintiffs. Anyone found in violation
of the FCA may be liable for both treble damages and a "per claim"
civil penalty of up to $10,000.111 Furthermore, these civil penalties
damages are to some extent mandatory. The FCA requires courts to
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (2005).
105. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
106. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1513
(M.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff can bring a claim alleging violations of the antikickback and anti-self-referral laws under the False Claims Act).
107. United States v. JT Constr. Co., 668 F. Supp. 592, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
108. Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1513.
109. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
110. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1518 (9th
Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) (holding that disclosure to employees or
potential availability to the public through the Freedom of Information Act does not constitute
"public disclosure.").
111. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
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impose civil penalties of at least $5000 and states that "the court may
assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the
government sustains because of the act of the person."112 Since "per
claim" has been interpreted to mean "per line item" and not "per bill,"
total recoveries in these cases have reached into the millions of
dollars. 113 The private plaintiffs that bring these qui tam actions
under the FCA could be awarded as much as thirty percent of the
government's total recovery, as well as all costs and attorneys' fees. 114
Therefore, successful plaintiffs stand to receive recoveries in the
millions of dollars without necessarily having suffered any actual
harm themselves. 115 Clearly, the FCA's procedural and financial
advantages make it an attractive option for plaintiffs seeking to bring
suit under a statute that does not provide its own private right of
action.
B. Using the FCA to Enforce the Privacy Rule
The Privacy Rule generally prohibits covered entities from
disclosing "protected health information"' 16 except in certain
situations.1 1 7 This broad prohibition has created vast amounts of
potentially illegal activity, including within its scope a host of
seemingly benign actions. 118 As a result, most hospitals are willing to
admit that they are not fully compliant with HIPAA regulations.1 1 9
112. Id.
113. See Michael Pretzer, Why You Should Have Been at the Health Lawyers' Convention,
National Health Lawyers Association's 1996 Conference, MED. ECON., Aug. 26, 1996, at 160, 166
(explaining how the FCA can multiply modest actual damages into multimillion-dollar
judgments). For example, HealthSouth recently agreed to pay the US government $325 million
to settle allegations of Medicare fraud in a case brought as a qui tam action under the FCA.
HealthSouth Agrees to Pay $325 Million to Resolve Medicare Billing Allegations, 14 HEALTH L.
REP. 25 (2005).
114. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2005).
115. The two qui tam plaintiffs in the HealthSouth case will receive $8.1 million and $4
million respectively. HealthSouth, supra note 110, at 25.
116. Protected health information is defined as "individually identifiable health information"
that is "[t]ransmitted or maintained in any form or medium." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006).
117. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2006).
118. For example, numerous Privacy Rule violations occur every day when hospital visitors
overhear hallway conversations between doctors and nurses. Hallway Talk Can Violate HIPAA
PrivacyRule, 13 REHAB CONTINUUM REP. 117 (2004).
119. In a recent survey, only 40.3% of health care providers indicated that they are in full
compliance with HIPAA regulations. AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF HIPAA PRIVACY AND SECURITY COMPLIANCE 11 (2005), available at
http://www.ahima.org/marketing/emailimages/2005PrivacySecurity.pdf.
One year after the
compliance deadline for hospitals and health plans, 4% have indicated that they are less than
50% compliant. Id. As of August 31, 2005, the HHS Office for Civil Rights had received 15,000
HIPAA privacy complaints and had trained 200 regional investigators to handle the additional
600 new complaints that the office receives on average each month. Health Information
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Considering the way the FCA has been significantly expanded in the
context of health care fraud, it seems quite possible that plaintiffs
could use the developing false certification theory to enforce Privacy
Rule violations. However, the results of allowing this type of suit to go
forward would be staggering, since each of the minor Privacy Rule
violations that occur on a daily basis would represent a potential
lawsuit.
A plaintiff attempting to establish a cause of action under the
FCA for a Privacy Rule violation must prove two major elements.
First, the plaintiff must show that the covered entity either expressly
or impliedly certified compliance with HIPAA regulations. The
plaintiff may be able to point to an actual representation of
compliance since Medicare laws expressly require claimants to certify
compliance with all federal laws. 120 However, even absent evidence
that claimants have expressly certified compliance, the plaintiff could
proceed under the implied false certification theory by arguing that
Medicaid hospitals have an affirmative duty to ensure compliance
12 1
with all HHS regulations.
Second, the plaintiff must prove that a recent Privacy Rule
violation made the representation of compliance legally false. In the
current health care climate, where Privacy Rule violations occur on a
regular basis, this second requirement would be easily met. Any time
a covered entity commits a Privacy Rule violation, it places itself in a
position of non-compliance with HIPAA regulations; therefore, any
subsequent claim for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement would

Privacy/SecurityAlert Focuses on HHS Referrals of HIPAA Privacy Complaints to Other Federal,
State Regulators; Oct. 12 Audio Seminar Helps Healthcare Cope with Government Investigations,
BUSINESS WIRE, Oct. 3, 2005, availableat Thomson Gale PowerSearch, Doc. No. A136993494.
120. The administrator or chief financial officer must certify compliance with Medicare laws
in the hospital's annual cost report. The regulations set forth the procedures related to the
filing of annual cost reports for Medicare and states that:
The following statement must immediately precede the dated signature of the
provider's administrator or chief financial officer: I hereby certify that I have
read the above certification statement and that I have examined the
accompanying electronically filed or manually submitted cost report and the
Balance Sheet Statement of Revenue and Expenses prepared by
(Provider Name(s) and Number(s)) for the cost reporting period beginning
_
and ending and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, this
report and statement are true, correct, complete and prepared from the books
and records of the provider in accordance with applicable instructions, except
as noted. I further certify that I am familiar with the laws and regulations
regarding the provision of health care services, and that the services
identified in this cost report were provided in compliance with such laws and
regulations.
42 C.F.R. 413.24 (2006) (emphasis added).
121. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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involve a false certification of compliance with all applicable laws and
would constitute a false claim.
C. Arguments Against FCA Enforcement of the Privacy Rule
1. FCA Enforcement of Privacy Rule Violations Could Lead to a Flood
of Litigation
Key differences exist between health care fraud and abuse laws
and HIPAA's Privacy Rule regarding their potential for FCA
enforcement, suggesting that FCA enforcement of the Privacy Rule
may not be desirable. Specifically, some of the limitations attached to
FCA enforcement of fraud would not be as effective in limiting the use
of the FCA to enforce the Privacy Rule. If aggressive qui tam plaintiffs
were able to enforce minor Privacy Rule violations, the result could be
a dramatic increase in medical privacy litigation. Failing to limit these
actions could have a net adverse effect on patients since heath care
providers would be forced to spend limited resources defending claims,
rather than treating patients. Furthermore, fear of liability may lead
to over-deterrence in the health care system, which could have a
negative impact on the standard of care provided to patients. Overburdening of courts could also affect legitimate plaintiffs by delaying
adjudication of even the most valid claims.
The FCA's dual scienter requirement acts as gatekeeper in the
health fraud context, limiting the potential number of claims by
imposing a higher burden of proof on potential qui tam plaintiffs. 122 In
contrast, there would be no dual scienter requirement for FCA
enforcement of the Privacy Rule since non-criminal HIPAA violations
do not carry any specific scienter requirement. 123 Covered entities
violate the Privacy Rule any time they improperly disclose protected
health information, regardless of whether such disclosure was
intentional, negligent, or entirely innocent. Therefore, every minor
Privacy Rule violation places the covered entity in a position of noncompliance with HIPAA regulations, automatically making any
122. See discussion supra Section III(A)(i), noting that the plaintiff in an FCA action must
prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to establish a violation of the underlying fraud
statute as well as the knowledge that a false claim was being submitted to the government so as
to satisfy the FCA's separate scienter requirement.
123. Generally, the HHS Secretary may impose civil fines on "any person who violates" the
Privacy Rule. 42 U.S.C. §1320d-5(a) (2005) (emphasis added). However, there are specific
scienter requirements related to the imposition of the various levels of criminal penalties. See 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2005) (establishing increasing criminal penalties for violations committed
"knowingly", those committed "under false pretenses", and those committed "for commercial
advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm.").
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subsequent claim for reimbursement a "false claim." Plaintiffs need
only meet the FCA's relatively low burden of proving that the covered
entity recklessly disregarded the fact that the claim was submitted
despite non-compliance with the Privacy Rule. 124 This should not be
exceedingly difficult to prove since health care providers are
apparently aware of the fact that they are not fully compliant with
125
HIPAA's regulations.
The only remaining limitation on qui tam actions is the FCA's
"original source requirement," which states that the plaintiff must
have "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
the allegations are based. . . ."126 This requirement can substantially
limit the ability of qui tam plaintiffs to bring actions for health fraud
since those allegations are based on information that is not generally
accessible to patients. 127 In contrast, most Privacy Rule enforcement
cases would easily meet the "original source" requirement because the
patient is likely to be the first to discover that his or her protected
health information was disclosed without permission.' 28 In these
cases, the "direct and independent knowledge" requirement would not
seem to pose a significant limitation on a plaintiffs ability to bring a
qui tam action.
When one combines the absence of limitation in pursing FCA
claims for Privacy Rule violations with the advantages the FCA
affords plaintiffs generally-especially the potential for large financial
recoveries1 2 9 -the incentives for plaintiffs to bring such actions are
great. This could lead to a flood of litigation with the potential to
cripple the health care industry.

124. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2005).
125. See AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 119, at 11

(reporting that a majority of hospitals admit that they are not fully compliant with HIPAA
regulations despite the fact that the deadline for full compliance has already passed).
126. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2005).
127. In order to prove an anti-kickback violation, the plaintiff must have direct and
independent knowledge that the defendant used remuneration to induce referrals. See 42 U.S.C §
1320a-7b(b) (2005) (prohibiting the solicitation, receipt, offer, or payment of remuneration in
return for referrals). Stark violations pose an even greater hurdle since the plaintiff must have
direct and independent knowledge of the financial and ownership structure of the health care
provider. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2005) (prohibiting physicians from making referrals to an
entity with which they have a "financial relationship").
128. Covered entities are permitted to release protected health information when the patient
consents. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(v) (2006). Since the appropriateness of the disclosure depends
on the patient's desires, the patient is uniquely well situated to determine when and if the
Privacy Rule has been ignored. Therefore, the patient is more likely to be the original source of
this information than the federal government or the any other party.
129. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
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2. The Supreme Court's Policy of Limiting § 1983 Actions Should
Apply to FCA Actions by Analogy
At least one commentator has made a comparison between
§ 1983 and the FCA as structurally similar statutory vehicles. 130 By
drawing an analogy between these two statutes, it can be argued that
the policy of limiting § 1983 claims is equally compelling in the FCA
context; therefore FCA claims should be limited in the same way that
13 1
§ 1983 claims have been limited in recent years.
Both § 1983 and the FCA allow parties to bring private actions
for violations of separate statutes that do not themselves provide
private causes of action. The Supreme Court has recently
132
demonstrated a reluctance to allow parties to bring § 1983 claims.
Under a § 1983 analysis, courts must analyze the underlying statute
to determine whether Congress intended to create an unambiguously
conferred federal right.133 The existence of a comprehensive
enforcement scheme in the statute itself provides a further limitation
on § 1983's availability.1 3 4 Since the Privacy Rule would presumably
fail to meet these requirements, private parties would not be able to
bring a § 1983 claim to enforce a Privacy Rule violation. 135 Parties
should not be able to usurp the policies that the Supreme Court has
advanced by resorting to the FCA as an alternative statutory vehicle
in order to circumvent the barriers imposed by § 1983.
3. FCA Enforcement of Privacy Rule Violations Undermines
Congressional Intent
FCA enforcement of Privacy Rule violations should be
precluded if such enforcement would undermine congressional intent.
In Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila,136 the Supreme Court held that an
action brought under a Texas law was completely pre-empted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), regardless of
137
whether or not the state law fell within an exception to preemption.
Justice Thomas reasoned that "[a]llowing respondents to proceed with
130. Phelps, supra note 90, at 1033-36.
131. See id. (arguing that the statutes' structural similarity supports the use of Section
1983's analytical tools to evaluate False Claims actions).
132. See discussion supra Section II.B (analyzing the Supreme Court's trend towards the
restriction of Section 1983 claims).
133. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002).
134. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 126-27 (2005).
135. See discussion supra Section II.C (arguing that the Privacy Rule would fail the tests for
Section 1983 enforceability set forth by the Supreme Court in Gonzaga and Abrams).
136. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
137. Id. at 221.
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their state-law suits would 'pose an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of Congress." 138 Extending this principle to the present
situation, a Privacy Rule violation should not be enforced through the
FCA if such an action would conflict with HIPAA's purposes and
objectives. Even though Aetna does not demand this result (the
conflicting statute in that case was a state law, whereas the
conflicting statute here-the FCA-is a federal statute), Justice
Thomas's concern is no less applicable in this situation. Courts should
not stretch the FCA so far beyond its original application as to
undercut Congress' intent in establishing HIPAA. 139 Therefore, the
analysis centers on whether qui tam enforcement of Privacy Rule
violations would undermine congressional intent. This type of
question rarely yields a clear answer, but current indications are that
Congress did not intend to create a private right of action for Privacy
Rule violations.
Congress undoubtedly contemplated private enforcement of the
Privacy Rule during HIPAA's formative years; therefore, the absence
of private enforcement language in the final regulations should not be
seen as an inadvertent omission, but a conscious choice. In a 1997
statement to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
HHS Secretary Donna Shalala made the following remarks:

-

We believe that any individual whose rights under the federal privacy law have been
violated-whether those rights were violated negligently or knowingly-should be
permitted to bring a legal action for actual damages and equitable relief. When the
violation was
done knowingly, attorney's fees and punitive damages should be
0
available.

14

Three years later, a White House press release echoed this
sentiment, stating that "[a]lthough these [administrative] enforcement
provisions will be helpful, they are no substitute for a private right of
action, which makes it possible for patients to be compensated for
harmful plan actions." 141 Commentators writing at the time also noted

138. Id. at 217 (quoting Pilot's Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)).
139 The utility of this analogy should not be overstated. Congress may not have intended
the Privacy Rule to be as exclusive and comprehensive as ERISA, and therefore the need to
protect it from circumvention through other avenues is arguably not as strong as in the case of
ERISA. It is clear, however, that the Privacy Rule was intended to create a uniform baseline of
medical record protection. Courts should protect congressional intent as to the enforcement of
this law to prevent the emergence of liability that was never envisioned under this scheme.
140. Protecting our Personal Health Information: Privacy in the Electronic Age: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 105th Cong. 23 (1997) (statement of Donna
Shalala, Secretary of Health & Human Services).
141. Press Release, White House, President Clinton Issues Strong New Consumer
Protections to Ensure the Privacy of Medical Records (Dec. 20, 2000), available at 2000 WL
1863510.
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the possibility that a private right of action could stem from these
142
regulations.
However, any suggestion that HIPAA's legislative history
supports private enforcement is undercut by the fact that the
regulations clearly establish a scheme of civil and criminal penalties
enforceable solely by the HHS Secretary. 143 Even though HHS
supports the development of a private right of action, 144 it has deferred
to Congress on this issue. 145 Despite the recommendations of HHS and
others, Congress's response has been one of inaction. Furthermore,
courts have consistently refused to recognize a private right of action
under HIPAA.1 46 If Congress desires this statute to be interpreted to
provide a private right of action then it must say so, which it has
declined to do thus far.
Moreover, HHS's use of prosecutorial discretion in determining
when to impose civil penalties on offending parties suggests that the
Privacy Rule's highly technical regulations were intended to be underenforced. HHS has stated that "a covered entity will not necessarily
1 47
suffer a penalty solely because an act or omission violates the rule.
Instead, "the Department will exercise discretion to consider not only
the harm done, but the willingness of the covered entity to achieve
voluntary compliance." 148 Such intentional under-enforcement
supports HHS's position that the Privacy Rule's purposes and
objectives are best served by focusing on achieving voluntary
compliance by providing technical assistance and educational
programs rather than by strictly enforcing the regulations by issuing
49
fines.1
142. See Chad Bowman, Anticipated Privacy Rule Could Give Tort Lawyers New Weapon,
Some Say, 9 HEALTH L. REP. 1852 (2000) (reporting predictions that plaintiffs could potentially
use HIPAA to bring tort claims, contract claims, federal trade claims, or FCA claims).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5, 6 (2005).
144. "[W]e believe that.., federal law should allow any individual whose rights have been
violated to bring an action for actual damages and equitable relief. The Secretary's
Recommendations, which were submitted to Congress on September 11, 1997, called for a private
right of action to permit individuals to enforce their privacy rights." 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, 82605
(Dec. 28, 2000).
145. 'We agree [that individuals should be able to sue for breach of privacy], but do not have
the legislative authority to grant a private right of action to sue under this statute. Only
Congress can grant that right." 65 Fed. Reg. at 82566.
146. See Runkle v. Gonzales, 391 F. Supp. 2d 210, 237-38 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing
plaintiffs HIPAA claim on the grounds that HIPAA does not create a private right of action);
Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp.2d 79, 100 (D.D.C. 2005) (same); O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Wyoming, 173 F. Supp.2d 1176, 1179 (D. Wyo. 2001) (same).
147. 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, 82603 (Dec. 28, 2000).
148. Id.
149. 65 Fed. Reg. at 82604. Prosecutors also used discretion in their enforcement of health
fraud laws by ignoring many of the benign, technical violations and instead targeting only the
most egregious violations. In that sense, the health care industry has been called "a speakeasy,

224

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1:199

Allowing private parties to bring actions under the FCA would
clearly frustrate the Privacy Rule's purpose. Qui tam plaintiffs acting
in their own self-interest cannot be expected to exercise the same
prosecutorial discretion as that which is exercised by the HHS
Secretary. Qui tam enforcement of Privacy Rule violations would lead
to suits based on technical violations for harmless activity that HHS
never intended to prosecute when it promulgated these regulations.
When one considers the countless number of benign violations that
occur in large hospitals every day, 150 it becomes apparent that such
enforcement could lead to a proliferation of suits brought by
aggressive qui tam plaintiffs. The threat of such litigation would stifle
the medical community and could conceivably lead to a decrease in the
quality of care that these entities provide. 15 1 It seems clear that FCA
enforcement of the Privacy Rule would conflict with the purposes and
objectives that Congress intended HIPAA to achieve.
IV. SOLUTION: ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVACY RULE VIOLATIONS THROUGH

TORT LAW

The Supreme Court has limited § 1983's scope in recent years,
ostensibly foreclosing a patient's ability to bring § 1983 actions for
Privacy Rule violations. Although FCA enforcement remains possible,
the incentives created by such an action could lead to a proliferation of
suits brought against health care providers, which could have a
negative effect on the quality of treatment that patients receive.
However, this should not lead to the conclusion that the Privacy Rule
is best left under-enforced, thereby barring injured patients from
bringing a private cause of action against the responsible party.
Medical privacy violations are a very serious issue that must be dealt
with in order to adequately protect patients' privacy rights and to
restore confidence in the health care system. 152 Therefore, it is
necessary to strike a balance between two competing interests: the
interest of allowing injured patients to recover for wrongs committed
against them, and the interest of protecting the health care system
with wholesale illegal conduct taking place but being winked at by prosecutors" who will only
prosecute "the loud and obnoxious drunks." James F. Blumstein, What Precisely is "Fraud"in the
Health Care Industry?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A25.
150. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the broad scope of potential Privacy Rule
liability created by the existence of numerous minor violations).
151. See Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad For Your Health? An Introduction to the
Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481, 500-03 (2000)
(discussing the various ways in which accessibility, rather than strict confidentiality, of medical
records can be used by various healthcare providers to achieve increased efficiency and a higher
quality of care for the patient's own benefit).
152 See discussion supra Part I (discussing loss of confidence in the health care system).
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from excessive liability. This Note proposes that, absent legislative
action, tort law provides the best system in which these interests can
be balanced.
Tort law is a system of redress for wrongs. 15 3 As such, its
primary goal is to compensate the plaintiff for harm caused as a direct
result of the defendant's breach of a recognized duty. 154 A right of
action grounded in tort law would allow plaintiffs who have been
legitimately harmed by unauthorized medical records disclosure to
recover for their injury, but would not allow unharmed, opportunistic
plaintiffs to enforce regulations that should be left to the HHS
Secretary's discretion. This would achieve the proper balance of
securing justice for patients without subjecting heath care providers to
frivolous litigation.
Prior to HIPAA's enactment, courts allowed patients to recover
against their physicians for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential
medical information. Such recoveries were based on two distinct
causes of action: (1) the traditional tort cause of action for invasion of
privacy and (2) the physician's breach of his professional duty of
confidentiality. This Note argues that courts should analyze medical
principles.
privacy actions under breach of confidentiality
Furthermore, because the Privacy Rule imposes new obligations on
health care providers, the underlying duty of care must be reanalyzed
in light of these changes to determine how courts should approach
medical privacy breaches in the future.
A. Invasion of Privacy
United States common law did not originally contain a right of
privacy until a law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis eventually led courts to explicitly recognize privacy as a
common law right. 155 Tort law currently recognizes four different ways
that a person's right of privacy may be invaded: (1) "unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another," (2) "appropriation of the
other's name or likeness," (3) "unreasonable publicity given to the
other's private life," and (4) "publicity that unreasonably places the
other in a false light before the public." 156 Of the four theories of
invasion of privacy, only the third theory-unreasonable publicity153. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 38 (Aspen Publishers 2004).

154. Id. at 3.
155. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (arguing that there exists a right of privacy, the violation of which is a
cognizable injury to which the law should provide redress).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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appears to be applicable in the context of medical record disclosures.
157 This cause of action may indeed be of limited use in certain cases;
however, it does not provide an adequate means of redress for most
medical record disclosures. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern
158
to the public.

This definition of invasion of privacy probably severely limits
its applicability to most cases of medical record disclosures for two
reasons. First, it is not entirely clear that a general disclosure of
medical records would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."
Although some health conditions carry a negative social stigma,
making any disclosure potentially offensive to the patient, this is not
necessarily true in every case. In many instances, disclosure to
strangers with no interest in the information would not be considered
offensive. Instead, it is the disclosure of medical records to entities
most interested in that information (employers, for example) that can
be most devastating to the patient.159
Second, the definition of "publicity" limits the applicability of
the violation of privacy tort in regards to garden variety medical
record disclosures. The Restatement explicitly defines this term as a
communication "to the public at large.' 1 60 Thus, invasion of privacy
would only allow plaintiffs to recover in the rare case that a patient's
medical information is made known to the general public, probably

157. The first theory, unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, is not applicable
to the problems set forth in this Note because most health privacy issues arise because of
improper disclosures, not because of affirmative acts of intrusion into someone's medical records.
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).

159. See, e.g., Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1426, 1442 (1982) ("Especially when information is confined to a confidential relationship, one
can imagine many cases where the greatest injury results from disclosure to a single person,
such as a spouse, or to a small group, such as an insurance company resisting a claim. A
confidential relationship is breached if unauthorized disclosure is made to only one person not a
party to the confidence, but the right of privacy does not cover such a case." (footnotes omitted)).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). This is in contrast to the
meaning of the word "publication" as it is used in connection with defamation law in Section 577,
"which includes any communication by the defendant to a third person." Id. 'The rationale
behind recognizing the tort of invasion of privacy is that '[t]he right to privacy is an integral part
of our humanity; one has a public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded
and preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall become public
and which parts we shall hold close."' Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550,
553 (Minn. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231,
236 (Minn. 1998).
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through the media.1 61 One can think of a host of medical privacy
violations that, while not disclosed to the public at large, are still very
162
harmful to the patients involved.
B. Breach of Confidentiality
1. Traditional Breach of Confidentiality Doctrine
Most jurisdictions recognize a common law cause of action for
breach of confidentiality when physicians improperly disclose a
patient's medical records.1 63 This breach of confidentiality tort differs
from invasion of privacy in several important ways. Most importantly,
a breach of confidentiality claim arises from a particular relationship
of trust between two individuals-in this case a doctor-patient
relationship. 164 The reason behind the law's protection of such
relationships is quite clear: "A patient should be entitled to freely
disclose his symptoms and condition to his doctor in order to receive
proper treatment without fear that those facts may become public
65
property. Only thus can the purpose of the relationship be fulfilled."'
Since breach of confidentiality is premised on a specific
relationship of trust, liability does not depend on the degree of
offensiveness or the public nature of the disclosure. 66 An
unauthorized disclosure to any third party that violates the
relationship of trust between doctor and patient may be actionable.

161. This doctrine may still be applicable in certain cases. There have been at least a few
documented examples of incidents involving public disclosure of medical records that could
implicate the invasion of privacy tort. See, e.g., Barbara Feder Ostrov, 140 Kaiser Patients'
PrivateData Put Online, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 11, 2005, at 2C ("In a troubling episode
involving medical privacy in the digital age, Kaiser Permanente is notifying 140 patients that a
disgruntled former employee posted confidential information about them on her Weblog."); Alissa
J. Rubin, Column One; Records No Longer for Doctors' Eyes Only; In Today's Health Care
System, Outside Parties Such as Insurers and Employees Have Access to Patients' Once-Private
Medical Information. Resulting Horror Stories Have Some Seeking New Rules., LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998, at Al ("Medical records of Rep. Nydia M. Velazquez's bout with depression
and a year-earlier suicide attempt were faxed to reporters just four weeks before the New York
Democrat's first congressional election in 1992.").
162. Notice, for example, that none of the three instances of medical privacy violations
referenced in the introduction of this note would fall within this cause of action, leaving these
patients with no possible legal recourse. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
163. Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 Rutgers L.J. 617, 654 (2002).
164. Vickery, supra note 154, at 1451 (stating that the duty of confidentiality "arises out of
broadly applicable societal norms and public policy concerning the kind of relationship at issue").
165. McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 436 (S.C. 1997) (quoting Hague v. Williams, 181
A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962)).
166. Winn, supra note 158, at 657-58.
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However, certain disclosures are justified and therefore do not
constitute a breach of confidentiality, particularly in circumstances
where public policy concerns outweigh the patient's interest of
confidentiality. 167 Furthermore, unlike the violation of privacy
doctrine, disclosure under breach of confidentiality does not have to be
intentional, and therefore includes circumstances where the physician
is simply negligent in his or her protection of the patient's medical
records. 168
2. Reanalyzing Breach of Confidentiality in Light of the Privacy Rule
The difficulty in breach of duty cases arises when courts must
ascertain whether certain disclosures of information are justified
despite the duty of confidentiality that the physician owes to the
patient. Such determinations should not be left to the vagaries of a
judicial balancing test, nor should physicians be forced to make these
difficult decisions without the benefit of some set of meaningful
standards to guide them. This is especially true when these standards
already exist-they are found in the Privacy Rule. Courts should
adopt the Privacy Rule as a set of minimum requirements that
illuminate the duty that physicians owe their patients in breach of
confidentiality cases.
In traditional breach of confidentiality cases, the duty of
confidentiality is derived from the protected relationship between
doctor and patient. Courts, however, need not rely on a traditionally
recognized relationship of confidentiality to find that a duty of
confidentiality exists, because in some cases a duty may be adopted
from a statute.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[t]he standard
of conduct of a reasonable man may be... adopted by the court from a
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which does not
so provide." 16 9 The rationale behind using a statute to define a
reasonable standard of care, instead of leaving this determination up
to the jury, can be summarized as follows:
[l]t would be against the very nature of the reasonably prudent and law-abiding citizen
to set one's own judgment up against that of the duly constituted lawmaking body of the
community. When the community has thus officially determined that certain risks are
foreseeable and are reasonably to be avoided by taking a prescribed precaution, no

167. Id. at 659.
168. See Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1271-72 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991) (finding breach of confidentiality based on negligence due to the hospital's
failure to take sufficient precautions to limit accessibility of patient's chart).
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285(b) (1965).
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reasonable person would 0thereafter omit the precaution, so there is no room for jury
17
judgment in the matter.

Thus, even though the Privacy Rule does not explicitly create a
duty of confidentiality for the purpose of tort liability, it may do so by
implication.
The only remaining requirement is that the statute must be
intended, at least in part, to protect a particular interest held by a
class of persons from a particular hazard that results in the kind of
harm the plaintiff has experienced. 17 1 This is simply to prevent
statutes from being stretched so far as to create liability where the
172
actors, conduct, or harm are beyond the statute's intended scope.
The Privacy Rule certainly meets this standard since it is specifically
intended to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of patient medical
records by covered entities. Thus, any suit brought to remedy harm
that has occurred as a direct result of such disclosure would seem to
be within the scope of the law as contemplated by these requirements.
It is important to note that allowing the Privacy Rule to shape
the duty of confidentiality in tort cases is not the same as creating a
new federal private right of action under HIPAA. Congress has clearly
chosen not to do this, and no amount of legal maneuvering will alter
this decision unless Congress itself revisits the issue. There is already
a preexisting common law cause of action for improper disclosure of
medical records by a physician under the breach of confidentiality
doctrine. The Privacy Rule acts merely as a guide, clarifying the
traditional common law duty. It has long been recognized that "[a]
state court is 'free to look to the provisions of a federal statute for
guidance in applying its longstanding common law remedies.' "173
3. Advantages and Criticisms of the Breach of Confidentiality Doctrine
An obvious benefit of integrating the Privacy Rule with tort law
is that it provides certainty and consistency to the nebulous scope of a
defendant's duty to protect the confidentiality of a patient's medical
records. The standards and principles set forth by HHS in the Privacy
Rule provide a rational standard of care for a factfinder with limited
experience in determining the bounds of confidentiality. Furthermore,
170. 3 FOWLER J. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6 (2d ed. 1986).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286.
172. The leading case on this matter is Gorris v. Scott, (1874) 9 L.R. Exch. 125 (U.K.). In that
case, defendant violated a statute requiring livestock to be kept in separate pens when being
transported by ship. Plaintiff sued when his livestock was washed away during a storm. The
court denied plaintiff damages, holding that the statute was designed as a sanitary measure, not
to protect against the loss of livestock during a storm. Id. at 129.
173. Winn, supra note 163, at 668 (quoting Hofbauer v. Nw. Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1197, 1201
(8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980))).
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since the Privacy Rule sets a baseline standard for medical record
protection, 74 the general public has a reasonable expectation that its
medical records will be protected pursuant to these standards. By
adopting this standard of care into tort law, courts will therefore be
fulfilling the public's reasonable expectations of patient privacy.
Furthermore, as aforementioned, by adopting a set of clear standards
of confidentiality, physicians will be better able to make reasonable
and informed decisions regarding when disclosure of medical records
is appropriate.
One of the major criticisms this Note directed against proposals
to use § 1983 or the False Claims Act to enforce the Privacy Rule
regarded issue of exorbitant damages. In contrast, a breach of
confidentiality action that incorporates the standards set forth in the
Privacy Rule achieves the goal of providing patients with a means of
redress based on HIPAA standards, while at the same time restricting
damages to more reasonable amounts.
The first step in this analysis is to reiterate that breach of
confidentiality is a type of tort. 175 Tort damages are determined by the
extent of plaintiffs injury and aim to redress the wrong that the
defendant committed. As such, tort damages are more closely tied to
traditional notions of justice than False Claims Act damages, which
allow unharmed plaintiffs to recover for harm that the government
sustained.
The amount of damages that a successful plaintiff is entitled to
in an unauthorized disclosure of medical records case is virtually the
same as in an invasion of privacy case.1 76 This would include harm to
the plaintiffs privacy interest, mental and emotional distress
(including public humiliation), and special damages.1 77 Plaintiffs can
1 78
recover for mental distress without having to show physical harm;
174. The Privacy Rule sets a national minimum level of medical record protection. While
states are free to enact higher levels of protection, any state laws providing for less protection are
preempted by the federal Privacy Rule. Therefore, patients can reasonably expect that their
records will be afforded at least as much protection as the Privacy Rule requires. See 45 C.F.R. §
160.203(b) (2006) (establishing that the Privacy Rule preempts a contrary state law unless the
state law provides a more stringent standard).
175. See Vickery, supra note 159, at 1451 ("First, the duty of confidentiality, where it exists,
generally arises out of broadly applicable societal norms and public policy concerning the kind of
relationship at issue. It does not arise out of specific agreement or particularized circumstances.
Moreover, the object of the law when this duty is violated is compensation for the resulting
injuries, not fulfillment of expectation.... Therefore, liability should be grounded in tort law.").
176. See Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 679 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1977) (awarding compensatory
damages for embarrassment, emotional distress, and actual costs incurred, totaling $20,000).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652H (1977).

178. Trevino v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that in
an invasion of privacy case, "[d]amages for mental suffering are recoverable without the
necessity of showing actual physical injury...").
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however, courts generally require plaintiffs to prove a high level of
mental anguish in order to recover damages. 179 Plaintiffs are also
entitled to recover for any pecuniary harm that was suffered as a
result of the privacy violation.18 0 Thus, plaintiffs would be able to
recover damages for lost future earnings in situations where
disclosure of medical records led to a loss of employment.
Additionally, tort law's theory of damages will limit the
number of successful cases that can be brought against health care
providers. Not every Privacy Rule violation will result in a successful
tort suit; to prevail, plaintiffs must also demonstrate a substantial
level of harm as a direct result of this violation. Thus, health care
providers will not be over-burdened with litigation, while justice will
not be categorically denied to plaintiffs who have been seriously
harmed by the unauthorized disclosure of their medical records.
Two criticisms that may be leveled against breach of
confidentiality in the medical privacy context are (1) that it does not
address the issue of medical record disclosures by downstream
business entities, and (2) that it may be pre-empted by ERISA. This
Note posits that these potential problems can be solved, and that the
breach of confidentiality doctrine will remain an effective remedy for
victims of medical privacy violations.
While the traditional breach of confidentiality action provides a
remedy in the case of disclosure by a physician, it does not apply to
disclosures made by downstream users. Since no protected
relationship of trust exists between the patient and these downstream
business entities, disclosure to a third party would not be considered a
breach of confidentiality. 181 So, when the disclosing party is not a
physician, but rather some other covered entity, such as a hospital or
an insurance company, patients may be left without a feasible remedy.
However, the Privacy Rule provides a possible solution to this
gap in the common law. Under the Privacy Rule, covered entities are

179. See id. (noting that mental anguish is "more than mere disappointment, anger,
resentment, or embarrassment, although it may include all of these. It includes a mental
sensation of pain resulting from such painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment,
indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair and/or public humiliation").
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652H cmt. d (1977) (stating that "plaintiff may
also recover for any special damage that he can prove, of which the invasion of privacy has been
the legal cause").
181. While fiduciary duties are generally understood to exist in a professional context,
particularly in regards to physician-patient relationships, courts are more reluctant to recognize
a fiduciary duty in general business transactions. See, e.g., Flights Concepts Ltd. P'ship v. Boeing
Co., 819 F. Supp. 1535, 1545 (D. Kan. 1993) ("Fiduciary obligations should be extended
reluctantly to commercial or business transactions."); Collins v. Nelson, 75 P.2d 570, 574 (Wash.
1938) (holding that, in order to establish a fiduciary duty, there must be something like "a
business agency, a professional relationship, or a family tie").
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allowed to release medical records to business associates, but are
required to enter a contract with those entities to "obtain[] satisfactory
assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the
information."'' 8 2 Professor Winn argues that this provision essentially
transfers the confidentiality requirements imposed on the health care
provider directly to the contracting entity.183 Third parties were
traditionally required to keep medical records confidential under the
theory that they impliedly "assumed" the duty of confidentiality that
the physician owed to the patient.1 8 4 Since the third party must now
expressly assume this duty under contract, it is even easier to hold
these downstream business entities to the same duty of confidentiality
that physicians are held to.18 5 Furthermore, Winn argues that the
contract between physician and business entity creates an agency
relationship. 8 6 He suggests that plaintiffs could sue the downstream
entity under a breach of confidentiality theory since, as the physician's
agent, the business entity owes the same duties to the plaintiff as the
physician did originally. 8 7 Thus, it appears likely that private parties
will be able to bring tort actions against business entities that
improperly disclose their medical records in much the same way as
they could bring such a suit against their health care providers.
V. CONCLUSION

Medical records contain highly personal information that, if
inappropriately disclosed, can have devastating effects on patients and
their families. These instances of disclosure add to patient mistrust
and privacy protective behaviors, which have a negative impact on the
healthcare system as a whole. Congress enacted HIPAA in order to
create a uniform minimum standard for the protection of medical
records and to provide federal oversight to this issue. Although the
statute allows the HHS Secretary to impose civil and criminal
sanctions on those who blatantly ignore the Privacy Rule regulations,
this type of enforcement only deters future violations-it does nothing
to compensate those patients who have suffered real and direct harm
as a result of such unauthorized disclosures.
Patients must have some means of redress against individuals
or entities that violate the Privacy Rule. However, this action must be

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) (2006).
Winn, supra note 163, at 673-74.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 674.

187. Id.
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balanced against the need for health care providers to share
information about their patients in order to realize the highest level of
care. Subjecting doctors and hospitals to an overwhelming flood of
litigation is not an adequate solution. While it might provide a strong
incentive for these actors to take every necessary step for the
protection of private health information, the costs of such litigation
would outweigh the potential benefits. Overly cautious doctors, who
refuse to share patient information with other doctors in an effort to
avoid litigation or privacy liability, will compromise health care
quality. Furthermore, subjecting health care providers to unnecessary
litigation would only increase the already exorbitant costs of
treatment. Therefore, if courts are to recognize some right of action
under HIPAA, it must be carefully limited to prevent aggressive
plaintiffs from suing providers for technical, benign violations.
Absent a congressional rewriting of HIPAA to explicitly
recognize a private right of action, tort law provides the most sensible
solution to this problem. Although a private cause of action for a
Privacy Rule violation has not been recognized up to this point, there
is sufficient support for the development of such an action within the
common law. Such a cause of action could be created by redefining the
duty of care owed under the breach of confidentiality doctrine to
reflect the new standards contained in the Privacy Rule. This will
allow legitimate plaintiffs to recover for actual harm that has resulted
from a breach of duty established by the Privacy Rule, while
simultaneously protecting health care providers from frivolous
litigation and exorbitant damage awards. Incorporating the Privacy
Rule into the common law duty of care will allow courts to remedy to
the problem of administrative under-enforcement of the Privacy Rule.
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